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ABSTRACT 
Yeh et al. recently have proposed a mutual authentication protocol based on EPC Class-1 Gen.-2 standard 
[1]. They have claimed that their protocol is secure against adversarial attacks and also provides forward 
secrecy. In this paper we will show that the proposed protocol does not have proper security features. A 
powerful and practical attack is presented on this protocol whereby the whole security of the protocol is 
broken. Furthermore, Yeh et al. protocol does not assure the untraceabilitiyand backwarduntraceabilitiy 
aspects. Namely, all past and next transactions of a compromised tag will be traceable by an adversary. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology is incorporated in our daily life. 
This technology is employed in many applications such as public transportation passes [2], supply 
chain management [3], e-passport [4], access control systems [5] and etc [6, 7]. RFID systems 
include tags, readers and back-end server. A tag is a low cost device which has a microchip, small 
memory and antenna to communicate with the reader. Readers are placed between tags and back-
end server as an intermediary for message transmission. On the other hand, the back-end server 
has the whole information and secret values of all tags. 
EPC Class-1 Gen.-2 is a standard that is provided by EPCglobal (Electronic Product Code) 
organization [8, 9]. This standard provides a framework for RFID communications. EPC C-1 G-2 
has restricted tags to some simple arithmetic operations such as CRC (Cyclic Redundancy 
checksum Code), PRNG (Pseudo Random Number Generator) and bitwise XOR. Therefore, 
RFID authentication protocols based on EPC C-1 G-2 standard have undergone some difficulties 
to provide perfect security aspects.  
One of the most important challenges related to RFID systems is security problems. In order to 
have secure authentication protocols, it is important that an adversary does not able to get any 
information related to the target tag. Privacy and untraceability are two important issues relevant 
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to RFID systems.Thus, an authentication protocol should assure the privacy characteristics such 
as untraceabilityand backward untraceability for tags and their holders [10]. 
Mentioned attacks aside, different threats related to RFID authentication protocols are mentioned 
as follows. 
• Information leakage: When a tag and reader communicate each other, they perform an 
authentication protocol and exchange some messages. The wireless communication channel 
between the tag and reader is insecure and it can be eavesdropped by an adversary. Therefore, 
each authentication protocol should be designed in a way that the adversary, with significant 
computational capabilities, does not be able to exploit the exchanged messages. Namely, the 
exchanged messages should not leak any information to the adversary [11]. 
• Tag Tracing and tracking: Tag tracing and tracking are damaging problems in RFID systems. 
Although the leakage of information is impossible, the untraceability of tag and its holder is not 
guaranteed in RFID systems. Indeed, untraceability means that if an adversary eavesdrops 
message transmission between a target tag and a reader at time t, he does not be able to 
distinguish an interaction of that tag at time t't [12]. 
• DoS attack: denial-of-Service (DoS) is one category of attacks on RFID systems. An attacker 
tries to find ways to fail target tag from receiving services. In desynchronization attack, which is 
one kind of DoS attacks, the shared secret values among the tag and the back-end server are made 
inconsistent by an attacker. Then, the tag and back-end server cannot recognize each other in 
future and tag becomes disabled [13].  
Many RFID authentication protocols have been proposed until now [14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 
21, 22, 23, 24]. Although mentioned protocols have wanted to provide secure and untraceable 
communication for RFID systems; many weaknesses have been found in them[25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 
30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38].However, Yeh et al. [1] have recently proposed a RFID mutual 
authentication protocol compatible with EPC C-1 G-2 standard that we name SRP (Securing 
RFID Protocol) in this paper. The authors have claimed that not only does not reveal SRP any 
information but also it has forward secrecy characteristic. Besides, robustness against DoSattack 
is the other claimed attribute of SRP. In this study, we show that SRP is vulnerable to a powerful 
and fatal attack that needs only 216 off-line PRNG computations. Despite of this attack, the whole 
security of this protocol will be destroyed inasmuch as RFID system is most vulnerable to tag and 
reader impersonation and DoS attack. Furthermore, we show that the SPR does not assure 
untraceability and backward untraceability. The notion backward untraceabilityis defined in 
section 4. 
2. RELATED WORK 
In this section we briefly study some authentication protocolswhichhave been proposedto provide 
secure communications in RFID systems. 
Dimitriou proposed an RFID authentication scheme that uses a challenge-response mechanism 
[39].Since the tag identifier remains constant between two successful sessions, this protocol is 
vulnerable to tracking attacks and tag impersonation attack. 
In [40], a lightweight authentication protocol is proposed by Ohkubo et. Al. This scheme provides 
indistinguishability and forward security characteristics. The scheme is based on a hash chain and 
uses two dissimilar hash functions H and G. This protocol does not provide protection against an 
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adversary that tries to de-synchronize the server and the tags, consequently resulting in a DoS 
attack.  
Juels [36] showed that cloning and counterfeiting attacks are applied simply on EPC tags. He 
proposed an unclonable authentication protocol to solve these problems. However, Duc et al. [20] 
have presented some weaknesses related to privacy and information leakage in Juels scheme. 
In [41],Karthikeyan and Nesterenko suggested a security protocol without complex cryptographic 
primitives. Only XOR and matrix operations were used in their scheme. Chien and Chen [12] 
showed that this protocol is vulnerable to replay attacks and does not assure the untraceability 
property. 
A mutual authentication protocol under the EPC C-1 G-2 standard was proposed by Chien and 
Chen [14]. They had used simple XOR, CRC and PRNG in their scheme. In [14] each tag needs 
to keep an EPC code and two secret keys , . Secret key  is used to tag authentication and 
secret key  is used to reader authentication. Both  and  are updated in each round whereas 
EPC code is permanent. For each tagsecret values , , 	
, 	
, EPC and DATA are 
stored in database. The protocol is initialed with sending a random number by the reader. As a 
result, the tag replies with (M1, ) where M1=CRC(EPC॥॥)⨁. After receiving the tag's 
response, the database searches for finding the correct tag and its corresponding information 
({, } or {	
, 	
}). Thenthe database computes M2=CRC(EPC॥)⨁ (x= old or 
new) and sends tag M2. At that point the database updates its secret keys as following: =	
, =	
, 	
=PRNG(	
) and 	
=PRNG(	
). The tag receives M2 and 
checks whether M2⨁=CRC(EPC॥). If it satisfies, the tag authenticates the database and 
updates  and  the same as with the database, else it terminates the protocol. 
Lopez et al. [37] showed some weaknesses of Chien and Chen's protocol including tag and reader 
impersonation and desynchronization attack. They also showed that this protocol does not 
guarantee forward security and it is vulnerable to tracing attack. Han and Kwon [15] also 
presented a desynchronization attack and two tag impersonation attacks on Chien and Chen's 
protocol in new methods. These attacks were mainly based on weak secure properties of CRC. 
3. REVIEW SRP 
3.1 Notations 
 
We use the notations the same as the notations were used in the original paper [1]. 
 
A:  malicious adversary 
 
EP:  16-bit string which is built by XORing six16-bit blocks of EPC code  
:The database index stored in the tag to find the corresponding record of the tag in the database 
:  The old database index stored in the database 
	
:  The new database index stored in the database 
DATA:  The corresponding record for the tag kept in thedatabase 
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H(.):  Hash function 
:  The authentication key stored in the tag for thedatabase to authenticate the tag at the (i + 
1)thauthentication phase 
:  The old authentication key stored in the database 
	
: The new authentication key stored in the database 
:  The access key stored in the tag for the tag toauthenticate the database at the 
(i+1)thauthentication phase 
:  The old access key stored in the database 
	
: The new access key stored in the database 
R:  the legitimate reader 
T :the legitimate tag 
X:  The value kept as either new or old to show which keyin the record of the database is found 
matched withthe one of the tag 
:  The random number generated by device Y (Y = R or T) 
: The parameter related to the tag Ti at time tj 
⨁:  bitwise XOR 
3.2 Initialization Phase  
 
For each tag the database is preloaded with nine secretvalues , , ,	
, 	
, 	
, 
EP, RID and DATA. Random values,  and  are generated by manufacturer andthe 
recorded values are set in a way that =	
=, =	
= and =	
=. Each tag 
records four values =, =, = and EP the same as with database. 
 
3.3 The (i+1)th Authentication Round 
The steps of the authentication phase in the round (i+1) of the protocol are presented as follows. 
1. The reader generates number  at random and sends it to the tag. 
2. After receiving , first the tag generates random number  , then it computes: 
 
M1 = PRNG (EP⨁)⨁ 
D = ⨁ 
E = ⨁PRNG(⨁) 
Now the tag forwards (, M1, D, E) to the reader 
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3. The reader computes V=H(RID⨁)and sends (,M1,D,E, ,V)to the database. 
4. As soon as receiving (, M1, D, E, , V ), the database performs the following procedure 
(a).For each stored RID, the database computes H(RID⨁) with received  and compares 
the result with V to find whether the computed value is the same as with V. If the matching is 
found the database authenticates the reader. 
 
(b).Dependent on the value of  one of the following two procedures is occurred: 
(i)  = 0 means it is the first access. For each entry (, , ,	
, 	
, 	
, EP, 
RID, DATA) the database computes PRNG (EP⨁), =M1⨁ and 	
=M1⨁	
. 
Then it checks whether   or 	
 matches PRNG(EP⨁). This process is repeated by 
database until a matching would be found.Dependent on which  or 	
 matches, value X is 
set to old or new. 
 
(ii) If  0, the database uses  as an index to find the corresponding recorded entry. When the 
database finds an entry that  matches, if it matches  then the value X is set to old, otherwise 
the value X is set to new. Then corresponding   and EP are extracted to check if 
PRNG(EP⨁)⨁is equal to M1. 
By XORing the extracted  with the received D, the database obtains   and ensures about 
correctnessof the value   by checking whether ⨁PRNG(⨁) is equal to the received E. 
 
(c)Computes M2=PRNG(EP⨁)⨁and Info=(DATA⨁RID), and sends them to the 
reader. 
(d) If X = new, it updates the stored values as follows: 
 = 	
	
 = PRNG (	
)  = 	
	
 = PRNG (	
)   	
	
 = PRNG (⨁) 
             But if X = old, it just updates 	
 as 	
 = PRNG(⨁). 
5. The reader XORs RID with the received Info and extracts DATA, then it sends M2 to the tag. 
The tag picks up the stored  and computes ⨁M2to find whether it is equal to 
PRNG(EP⨁). If the matching would be found, the database is authenticated and the tag 
updates as follows: 
!" = PRNG () !" = PRNG () #$1=PRNG (⨁) 
4. VULNERABILITIES of SRP 
In this section we will show the most important vulnerabilities of SRP. We first present a 
practical and powerful attack on SRP in which an adversary obtains the most important secret 
value of a tag which calledEP. Aside from the above problem, the SRP is also vulnerable to 
tracing attacks. We show that the SRP does not provide backward untraceabilityand 
untraceability. 
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4.1 Reveal EP 
In SRP it is mentioned that EPis a 16-bit string which is constructed from XORing six 16-bit 
blocks of EPC code. Since  and   are XORed with EP, we conclude the bit lengths of   
and   are the same as bit length of EPWhich is 16. Since ,   and are updated by PRNG, 
the bit lengths of them must be equal to the output length of PRNG which is 16. 
 
In SRP the bit length of EP is very short and it is also fix in all rounds of the protocol, thus an 
adversary can exploit this weakness to get EP. He just needs to perform two consecutive 
sessions with the target tag and then calculate 2"' off-line PRNG computations. The procedure of 
our attack is explained as follows. 
• The adversary starts a session with the target tag Ti in the round (i+1) by sending random 
number ".Ti replies with (, M1",(", )"). The adversary reserves M1"and terminates 
the session. Then he performs the second session with Ti by sending * and gets tag's 
response as (, M1*,(*, )*). 
• Since the first session is not completed, Ti does not update its secret key  for the second 
session. Hence M1"and M1* are constructed as follows:  
 
M1"= PRNG (EP⨁") ⨁ 
M1*= PRNG (EP⨁*) ⨁ 
• A omits by XORingM1"andM1*:  
M1"⨁M1*= PRNG (EP⨁")⨁ ⨁PRNG (EP⨁*)⨁ = PRNG 
(EP⨁")⨁ PRNG (EP⨁*) = + 
Where + is a 16-bit string as a result of M1"⨁M1*. 
• Let L={,",,* , …, ,*-.} be the set of all bit strings with length 16. Since EP is a bit 
string with length 16, thusEP /L. By having +, "and *, the adversary proceeds 
according to the below algorithm: 
Algorithm 1 
For 1 0 i 0 2"' 
Choose , /L 
1 =PRNG (,⨁") ⨁ PRNG (,⨁*) 
If  1 =+ then return , as EP 
End for 
After at most 2"' execution of the algorithm, the adversary finds the correct EP. As a result of 
the above attack and due to knowing the value of EP, we present three important attacks on 
SRP. 
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4.1.1 Tag Impersonation 
By having EP, the adversary simply gets the secret key  by a passive attack. He listens to the 
communication channel between the legitimate reader R and the target tag Tiin the round (i+1) to 
obtain 2 and (, M12,(2, )2). Since the adversary has EP, he computes PRNG 
(EP⨁2). Thus thesecret key  is computed as:    = M12⨁(EP⨁2) and  !" = 
PRNG (). 
The random number 2 is computed as: 2 = D⨁and finally the index for the next session is 
computed as #$1=PRNG (2⨁2) 
Now, the adversary starts a new session with the reader. R sends 3 to him and he replies with 
(, M13,(3, )3) where M13 = PRNG (EP⨁3)⨁, (3= ′3⨁and )3= ′3⨁PRNG(⨁). Because these values are calculated correctly, the database accepts the 
adversary and authenticates him. 
4.1.2 Reader Impersonation and DoS Attack 
Aside from tag impersonation, SRP is also vulnerable against two other attacks. By revealing 
EP, the adversary can forge a legitimate reader and then desynchronize the target tag. The 
procedure of these attacks is explained as following. 
• The adversary listens to the communication between R and Tiin the round (i+1) to obtain 4, (, M14,(4, )4) and M24. Since the adversary has EP, he computes 
PRNG(EP⨁4) and  gets the secret key  as: =M14⨁PRNG(EP⨁4) and !"=PRNG(). The secret key  is gotten as: =M24⨁PRNG(EP⨁4)  and !"=PRNG (5 where 4=(4⨁. 
• He begins a new session with Ti and sends it '. Ti replies with (!", M1',(', )') 
which are created with the help ofEP, ', , '  and !". 
• After receiving the tag's response, the adversary extracts ' as: '=('⨁, then he 
computes M24=PRNG(EP⨁')⨁!"and sends it to the tag. 
• Ti checks whether M24⨁!"=PRNG(EP⨁'), since this condition is satisfied, Ti 
authenticates the adversary and updates its secret values as : 
!* = PRNG(!") 
!* = PRNG(!"5 
#$2=PRNG('⨁') 
When this session is terminated, the stored secret values on Tiare (!*,!*, #$2,EP) whereas 
the database has stored (, , , !", !", #$1,RID,EP, DATA). Now, they are 
desynchronized, since the secret values stored in database are completely different from the 
values stored in the tag. 
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4.2 Privacy Analysis 
The authors of SRP have claimed that their protocol has forward secrecy as well as the SRP is 
resistant to the tracing attacks. We show that the SRP has not forward secrecy. Aside from this 
weakness, we also present an attacks on untraceabilityof SRP.  
4.2.1 Privacy Model 
Some privacy models have been proposed by researchers to evaluation of RFID protocols [10, 42, 
43, 44].Juels and Weis gave a formal definition of the privacy and untraceability model [42]. The 
samedefinition is described by Ouafi and Phan in their work presented in ISPEC’08 [44] and we 
will use this model to analyze the SRP protocol.The model that has been described in [44] is 
summarized as follows. 
The protocol parties are tags (T) and readers (R) which interact in protocol sessions. In this model 
an adversaryAcontrols the communication channel between all parties by interacting either 
passively or actively with them. The adversaryAis allowed to run the following queries:  
• Execute (R, T, i )query. This query models the passive attacks. The adversary 
Aeavesdrops on the communication channel between T and R and gets read access to the 
exchanged messages between the parties in session i of a truthful protocol execution. 
• Send (U, V, m, i) query. This query models activeattacks by allowing the adversaryAto 
impersonate some reader U /R(respectively tag V/T  ) in some protocol session iand 
send a messagemof its choice to an instance of some tag V /T(respectively reader U /R ). 
Furthermore the adversary A is allowed to block or alert the message mthat is sent from 
U to V(respectively  V to U) in session iof a truthful protocol execution. 
• Corrupt(T,  ′) query. This query allows the adversaryA to learn the stored secretK of 
the tagT/T, and which further sets the stored secret to ′ .Corrupt query means that the 
adversary has physical access to the tag, i.e., the adversary can read and tamper with the 
tag’s permanent memory. 
• Test (i, To, T1) query. This query does not correspond to any of A’s abilities, but it is 
necessary to define the untraceability test. When this query is invoked for sessioni, a 
random bit b/{0, 1} is generated and then, A is givenTb / {To, T1). Informally, Awins if 
he can guess the bit b.  
Untraceable privacy (UPriv) is defined using the game g played between an adversary A and a 
collection of the reader and the tag instances. The game gisdivided into three following phases: 
Learning phase:A is given tags To and T1 randomly and he is able to send any Execute, Send 
and Corrupt queries of its choice to T0, T1 and reader.  
Challenge phase: A chooses two fresh tags T0, T1 to be tested and sends a Test (i, To, T1) query.  
Depending on a randomly chosen bit b / {0, 1}, A is given a tag Tbfrom the set {T0, T1 
}.Acontinues making any Execute, and Send queries at will. 
Guess phase: finally, A terminates the game g and outputs a bit b' /{0, 1}, which is its guess of 
the value of b.  
The success ofAin winning gamegand thus breaking the notion ofUPrivis quantified in 
termsAadvantage in distinguishing whetherAreceivedT0 or T1 and denoted by  678 6:;<=8 (k) 
where k is the security parameter.  
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678 6:;<=8 (k) =| pr (b = >΄5 – pr (random flip coin) |= | pr (b' = b) - "* |   where 
00 678 6:;<=8 (k) ≤ "*. 
In [10], the notionbackward untraceability is defined as: " backward untraceability states that 
even if given all the internal states of a target tag at time t, the adversary shouldn't be able to 
identify the target tag's interactions that occur at time t' < t. ". 
4.2.2 Backward Untraceability 
In this section we will show how to break the notion backward untraceability in the SRP 
protocol. Note that EP is fix in the all rounds of SRP and an adversary can exploit this 
weakness to track a target tag. In particular, consider an adversary A performingthe following 
steps: 
Learning phase:A sends a Corrupt(T0,  ′) query in the round (i+1)and thus obtains 
(? , ? , ? , ),?). 
Challenge phase: A chooses two fresh tags T0, T1 to be tested and sends a Test (i, To, T1) query.  
Depending on a randomly chosen bit b / {0, 1}, A is given a tag Tb from the set {T0, T1}. A 
makes an Execute (R, Tb, i) query in the round (i) and as a result, A is given messages 
{,@"A ,(B1@"A , (@"A , @"A , )@"A )}. 
Guess phase: finally, A terminates the game g and outputs a bit b'/{0, 1} as its guess of the 
value of b.  In particular, A performs the following procedure to obtain the value b': 
He computes PRNG(),?⨁,@"A )⨁B1@"A = C where C is a 16-bit string. 
Autilizes the following simple decision rule: 
b' =D#E  (@"A ⨁) @"A  C⨁FGH@"A ⨁CI>′  0 KLMNOP#QN                                                     >′  1R 
Thus we have: 
678 6:;<=8 (k) =| pr (b' = b) – pr (random flip coin) | = | pr (b' = b) - "* |= |1 -"*| = "* S T 
Proof: By the fact that EPis a permanent value in the all rounds of the protocol, we have EPC,XY?= EPC,X@"Y? . Thus we have the following procedure: 
If Tb=T0⇒ PRNG(EPC,XY?⨁N,X@"Y\ ) =PRNG(),?⨁N,X@"Y? )                   (1) 
If Tb=T0⇒ M1X@"Y\  = M1X@"Y? = PRNG(EPC,XY?⨁N,X@"Y? )⨁KX@"Y?                      (2) 
(1), (2) ⇒ PRNG(EPC,XY?⨁N,X@"Y\ )⨁M1X@"Y\ = PRNG(EPC,XY?⨁N,X@"Y? ) ⨁ M1X@"Y? =PRNG(EPC,XY?⨁N,X@"Y? )⨁PRNG(EPC,XY?⨁N,X@"Y? )⨁KX@"Y? =KX@"Y? =C (3) 
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If Tb=T0⇒(@"A ⨁) @"A =(@"?  ⨁ ) @"? =Y,@"? ⨁KX@"Y? ⨁Y,@"? ⨁PRNG(CX@"Y? ⨁KX@"Y? )=KX@"Y? ⨁ 
PRNG(CX@"Y? ⨁KX@"Y? ) = C ⨁ PRNG(CX@"Y? ⨁C)= C ⨁ PRNG(@"A ⨁C)           (4) 
4.2.3 Untraceability 
An authentication protocol for RFID systems should assure the privacy of a tag and its holder. 
However, many RFID protocols put it at risk by designing protocols where tags answer readers' 
queries with permanent values, thus performing traceability attacks not only possible but trivial.  
Now, we show how the SRP does not guarantee privacy location, thusallowing tags tracking. 
Learning phase:A sends anExecute (R, T0, i+1) query in the round (i+1) by sending NR1and thus 
obtains (B1? , (? , ? , )?). 
Challenge phase: A chooses two fresh tagsT0, T1 to be tested and sends a Test (i+1, To, T1) 
query.  Depending on a randomly chosen bit b/ {0, 1}, A is given a tag Tb from the set {T0, T1}. 
A makes an Execute (R, Tb, i+1) query by sending NR1 and as a result, A is given messages 
(B1A , (A , A , )A). 
Guess phase: finally, A terminates the game g and outputs a bit b' /{0, 1} as its guess of the 
value of b.  In particular,Autilizes the following simple decision rule: 
b' =D if  B1A  B1?>′  0 otherwise                                         >′  1R 
Hence we have: 
678 6:;<=8 (k) =| pr (b' = b) – pr (random flip coin) | = | pr (b' = b) - "* |= |1 -"*|  ="* S T 
Proof: According to the protocol, we have the following equations: 
 
B1?=PRNG(),?⨁NR1)⨁?                                                                         (5) 
B1A=PRNG(),A⨁NR1)⨁A                                                                        (6) 
Note that T0 does not update its secrets in the Learning phaseand uses the same secret key  in 
both Learningand Challenge phase. Now we have the following result: 
If Tb=T0⇒B1A=PRNG(),A⨁NR1)⨁A=PRNG(),?⨁NR1)⨁?=B1?(7) 
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CONCLUSION 
In this paper, the significant security flaws in the Yehet al. mutual authentication protocol were 
showed. We presented a powerful and practical attack on SRP which revealsthe permanent secret 
value of the target tag. This attack leads to tag and reader impersonation and desynchronization 
attack on this protocol. Moreover we showed this protocol does not have privacy aspects such as 
untraceability and backward untraceability. Our privacy analysis was presented in a formal 
privacy model. 
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